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Where do we stand on discounts? - A 
Danish perspective  
The dominant undertaking’s ability to award discounts and other loyalty 
inducing considerations are subject to much ambiguity and many unsettled 
issues. Despite discounts being a commercial requirement, even for the dom-
inant undertaking, it’s difficult to draw up clear principles, and while the 
approach to non-dominant undertaking’s restriction of competition has 
been fundamentally recast over the last 20 years, the appraisal of single 
company behaviour remains more formal and rigid. However, there have 
recently been indications that some of the same leniency might have been 
extended to discounts and single company behaviour. Consequently, an at-
tempt shall be made to provide some guidelines under EU and Danish prac-
tice’red.1 Danish companies would normally be governed by both and the 
later has been aligned to the former, thus providing general guidance on EU 
practice. 
Across the years it has been difficult, if not impossible, to establish a clear red 
line on the approach to discounts under Article 102 of the EU Treaty and the 
Danish equivalent, paragraph 11.2 Moreover there is also inconsistency and sub-
stantial confusion about  the actual enforcements of both regulations. In particu-
lar in respect to the underlying economic theories, which are generally favoura-
ble to discounts,3 and the much more balanced approach demonstrated in non-
dominant undertakings agreements under Article 101 of the EU Treaty and the 
Danish equivalent, paragraph 6. Differences it’s difficult to provide a single and 
clear explanation for, as the dominant undertakings can share the same need to 
 
1
 Associate Professor Christian Bergqvist, ph.d. University of Copenhagen - Faculty of Law. 
The article has been updated to July 2015. Comments and suggestions are welcome at 
cbe@jur.ku.dk 
2
 In contrast has discount in USA traditionally not merited much interest c.f. Note by the Unit-
ed States for the "Roundtable on loyalty or fidelity discounts and rebates", 29 May 2002 
OECD. However, lately the discussions have re-emerged, as detailed by Damien Geradin 
Loyalty Rebates after Intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to Overturn Hoffman-
La Roche, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2015 (11), section D. 
3
 For more on the economic approach to discounts see e.g. Francisco Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz & 
Robbert Snelders Abuse of Dominance Under Article 102 TFEU, Claeys & Casteels 2013, 
pp. 334-347. 
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conclude, e.g. long term arrangement for product optimizing and planning pur-
poses, as non-dominant undertakings. Nevertheless, so far it is only the later 
which has benefitted from the more balanced approach enshrined by the new dis-
tinction between agreements that per object restrict competition and those that 
only do this by effect and therefore warrant further and substantial analysis be-
fore condemnation.4 While it might be too early to settle the matter, there are 
nevertheless indicators that some of the same considerations have as of late been 
extended to Article 102, making certain forms of single company behavior sub-
ject to a per see prohibition, whilst others only can be condemned following a 
more substantial effect analysis. However, the translation is neither clear nor 
complete, thus bluring the line between behaviors subject to a rigid and formal 
analysis and those meriting further considerations. 
1. Discounts and competition law 
While a complete list of competition law problems related to discounts and other 
favours extended from the dominant undertaking never can be made, a number 
of issues of interest can be identified from a practical perspective, including: 
a) The dominant undertaking’s ability to award discounts and other ad-
vantages in general. 
b) The special problems and challenges in respect to the handling of econom-
ics of scale and scope, and the use of discounts for the purpose of securing 
these. 
c) Horizontal foreclosure of a direct competitor or the creating of artificial ac-
cess barrier or switching cost for the purpose of retaining market exclusivity 
including ”discriminatory” foreclosure. 
d) Distorting competition downstream by reserving discounts for selected cus-
tomers (“real” discrimination). 
e) Favors offered to subsidiaries or vertically integrated activities. 
Rather than representing different doctrines, the listing would represent situa-
tions and potential conflicts that could emerge for the dominant undertakings 
when they contemplate offering discounts. From a practical perspective a distinc-
tion should be made between a, b and c contra d and e, as the latter two are only 
applicable in relation to the question of discrimination. Nevertheless, an attempt 
to deal with all of these issues and problems within the same framework shall be 
attempted. Furthermore, rather than using the words exclusion and exclusionary 
effect, the word foreclosure is preferred in order to underline how an anti-
 
4
 C.f. Richard Whish & David Bailey, Competition law, 7. Edition Oxford 2012, pp. 115-136. 
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competitive effect can emerge without actual exclusion.5 The disciplinary effect 
of e.g. selective discounts can be equally detrimental to the interest of consumers 
and competition and therefore in need of containment. Furthermore, because 
Danish undertakings are normally governed by both EU and Danish competition 
law and the later is aligned with the former, Danish and EU practice are incorpo-
rated into the same paper.6 Where possible the EU Commission’s Guidance on 
the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings from 2009, hereafter 
”Enforcement Paper”7 is utilized, predominantly in relation to loyalty discounts. 
Regrettably, the Enforcement Paper does not include principles on discriminato-
ry discounts,8 but many of its principles can be recycled and guidelines neverthe-
less be extracted from these. The legal standing of the Enforcement Paper is 
somewhat ambiguous. While the EU Commission has rebutted the analytical 
framework as neither mandatory nor part of the abuse standard,9 the General 
Court has limited itself by declining a retroactive application for cases predating 
its adoption.10 At national level, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authori-
ty, which enforces competition law in Denmark, has decided that the paper, de-
spite its many prudent considerations, does not govern national competition au-
thorities and enforcement.11 All of these elements create, by their very nature, a 
level of uncertainty in respect to the legal standing of the paper. In addition, Dan-
ish practice has traditionally been governed by an outdated and negative ap-
proach to discrimination, including discounts, which results in the victimizing of 
small and medium sized companies, indicating a difference compared to EU 
practice supposedly governing its application.12 On the other hand, a much more 
 
5
 C.f. Enforcement Paper, recital 68. See also the Danish case LK A/S grossistaftaler, Competi-
tion Council Meeting den 20. November 2000 and the EU case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 
150. Both deal with the creation of strategic access barriers through discounts. 
6
 Older Danish practice pre-dating EU alignment has been summarized in Prisdiskriminering i 
relation til konkurrenceloven, Memo from the Danish Competition and Consumer Authori-
ty 1998. 
7
 The prior DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuse is incorporated where relevant.  
8
 The Commission originally appears to have intended to issue a parallel paper on discrimina-
tion c.f. MEMO/05/486 - Commission discussion paper on abuse of dominance - frequent-
ly asked questions.  
9
 See COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel, e.g. recital 1002 & 1760. 
10
 C.f. case C-549/10P – Tomra, recital 81 and case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 155. 
11
 See Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 24. 
June 2009, recital 482, note 96. An issue challenged subsequently and currently part of the 
questions tabled before the European Court of Justice, as case C-23/14 - Post Danmark A/S 
v. Konkurrencerådet. 
12
 As detailed later, there lacks a theoretical framework for condemning discounts victimizing 
small and medium sized undertakings, making the traditional approach problematic. 
Where do we stand on discounts? - A Danish perspective  
 4
relaxed approach has been taken in regards to discriminatory discounts targeting 
end-users or which incorporate a geographical discriminatory element. Both of 
these have been very negatively appraised by the EU Commission under EU 
practice, and have triggered prompt and harsh reactions. 
2. Discounts and competition law – doctrines and sub doctrines 
From an academic perspective, 5 issues of special interest could be identified 
when dealing with discounts as noted above. But from a more legal perspective, 
these could be narrowed down to 3 situations where discounts can potentially be 
abusive involving if they are: 
a) Loyalty inducing, replacing a traditional exclusive agreement foreclosing 
the market for competition (Article 102 (b) and Danish Competition Act 
paragraph 11 (3) no. 2). 
b) Discriminatory in a manner thwarting competition downstream (Article 102 
(c), and Danish Competition Act paragraph 11 (3), no. 3). 
c) Conditioned upon acquiring of complementary products or services (bun-
dling discounts), incorporating a combined exploitation of end-users and 
foreclosing of competitors (Article 102 (d) and Danish Competition Act 
paragraph 11 (3) no. 4). 
There is a large area of overlap between the three situations and their respective 
subparagraphs. In the two EU cases Suiker Unie13 and Hoffmann La Roche14, the 
discounts infringed both Article 102 (b) and Article 102 (c) due to their com-
bined loyalty inducing and discriminatory effect. Likewise, where a combined 
discriminatory and bundling element included in the EU case British Sug-
ar/Napir Brown,15 and the Danish Scandlines rabatvilkår ved udstedelse af kom-
binationsbilletter til lastbiler.16 In the first case, customers where denied a dis-
count for self-pickup and in the later awarded a discount subject to using the 
same shipping company when crossing two separate straights.17 Furthermore, se-
lective discounts can overlap with predatory pricing. This can happen as either 
standalone abuse or part of exclusionary discrimination, where discounts are re-
served for certain customers. As neither Article 102 nor Danish Competition Act 
 
13
 United cases C-40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114-73 - Suiker Unie, ECR 1975, p. 1663, re-
cital 518-528. 
14
 Case C-85/76 - Hoffman La Roche, ECR 1979, p. 461, see recital 90. 
15
 Case IV/30.178 - Napir Brown - British Sugar, O.J. 1988L 284/41. 
16
 Scandlines rabatvilkår ved udstedelse af kombinationsbilletter til lastbiler, Competition 
Council Meeting den 28. January 1998. 
17
 See also case C-85/76 - Hoffman La Roche, ECR 1979, p. 461 og T-30/89 - Hilti, ECR 1991, 
p. II.1439 and the Danish DBC medier as, Competition Council Meeting 22 June 2005. 
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paragraph 11 represents an exhaustive list, its not critical to link a discount 
scheme to one of the subparagraphs. Only the effect should matter.18 
Below, loyalty discounts will be discussed first, followed by the discriminatory. 
As already indicated, the division is artificial and should not be obscured by 
overlaps. Further, it’s not entirely clear how to approach selective price cuts 
which provide for some recurrences. Bundling discounts under Article 102, sub-
paragraph d and Danish Competition Act paragraph 11 (3) no. 4 are only treated 
sporadically and somewhat superficially due to the fact that they have not  creat-
ed much confusion. Further, despite that the wording of Article 101 and older 
Danish practice indicate that vertical discount arrangements also could be re-
viewed if they incorporate a discriminatory element, this has not been comment-
ed upon. Essentially, it appears to be manifestly wrong19 to make discounts sub-
ject to review under Article 101. From a more practical point of view, an overlap 
between Article 101 and 102 and their Danish equivalents might nevertheless ex-
ist, in particular with respect to vertical or horizontal agreements reserving fa-
vourable, and hence discriminatory, conditions for a limited number of compa-
nies.20 
3. The concept of abuse and discounts 
It follows from Hoffmann-La Roche21 and AKZO22 that the concept of abuse is 
an objective concept, rendering the effect the primary, and in principle, the only 
consideration relevant for appraisal. Furthermore, it is the potential anti-
competitive effect, i.e. the ability to directly or indirectly restrict competition, 
that is subject to review and condemnation. An approach incorporated in a recent 
Danish case, TV 2' priser og betingelser23, from 2005 disregards the need to 
identify an actual impediment to competition. It was sufficient that the discounts 
had as an objective to or effect of restricting competition, which made these dis-
 
18
 C.f. e.g. case C-95/04 - British Airways, recital 58. 
19
 It is unclear if the Danish Competition Authority has accepted this. In Daniscos salg af indu-
strisukker - rabatordninger og terminskontrakt, Competition Council Meeting den 26. 
May 2004 and Fritz Hansen A/S' partneraftale, Competition Council Meeting den 20. De-
cember 2006, where intervention was taken against discounts offered by non-dominant 
undertakings.  
20
 See e.g. the Danish cases Anmeldelse af lægemiddelgrossisternes rabataftale, Competition 
Council Meeting den 30. September 1998, EKKO's klage over diskriminerende fragttillæg, 
Competition Council Meeting 27 October 1999 and Clearing af taxiboner og kontokort i 
Storkøbenhavn, Competition Council Meeting 31 May 2006.  
21
 Recital 91. 
22
 Case C-62/85, AKZO, ECR 1991, p. I-3359, recital 69. 
23
 TV 2's priser og betingelser, Competition Council Meeting 21 December 2005 recital 183. 
See also case T-203/01 - Michelin II, ECR 2003, p. II-4071, recital 239 and United cases 
C-40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114-73 - Suiker Unie, ECR 1975, p. 1663 recital 518-528. 
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counts potentially problematic. Perhaps even more restrictively, it was expressed 
in SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser24 from 2007, another Danish case in which 
it was held that, in the absence of an objective reason, (any) discount system 
would be considered abusive.  
As a consequence of the objective nature, any subjective motives, including good 
faith, should in principle be irrelevant.25 A position taken by the Commission in 
PO/World Cup 199826 dismissing the need for any advantages for the dominant 
undertaking.27 On the other hand, subjective elements may nevertheless be rele-
vant. Cost reductions should e.g. be accepted as a valid defense regardless of an 
anti-competitive effect while malicious foreclosure intent could be considered an 
aggravating factor.28 However, following Michelin II29, a cost reduction defense 
would only be admissible subject to rigid evidence requirements, making the an-
ti-competitive effect, including the potential effect, the starting point for any ap-
praisals regardless of more subjective motives.30  
Practice has only indicated a limited need for a distinction between different 
sorts of discounts,31 condemning advantages as target discounts, bonus, forward 
booking discounts,32 cash payment,33 marketing contributions34 and selective 
price cuts.35 Further, price differences have been labelled as a discount36 and it 
doesn’t matter if the discounts are widely offered or limited to a geographical ar-
 
24
 SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser, Competition Council Meeting 30 August 2007, recital 
140.  
25
 See case T-271/03 - Deutsche Telecom, recital 192 and General Advocat in case C-681/11 - 
Schenker, for some acceptance of good faith as mitigating factor. 
26
 Case IV/36.888 - PO/World Cup 1998, O.J. 2000L 5/55, recital 102. 
27
 See also case C-549/10P - Tomra, e.g. recital 73 disregarded that no loss was endured. 
28
 C.f. case 549/10P - Tomra, recital 20. 
29
 Case T-203/01 - Michelin II, ECR 2003, p. II-4071. 
30
 See also SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser, Competition Council Meeting 30. August 
2007, recital 140-142, indicating limited room for discounts with no objective purpose. 
31
 C.f. Hoffmann La Roche, recital 96, case C-95/04 - British Airways, recital 68 and case T-
203/01 - Michelin II, recital 91. 
32
 See Daniscos salg af industrisukker – rabatordninger og terminskontrakt, Competition 
Council Meeting 26 May 2004 and LK A/S grossistaftaler, Competition Council Meeting 
20. December 2000, for cases involving advanced booking discounts. 
33
 Case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 199-207. 
34
 Marketing contributions where revived and condemned in the Danish cases Arla Foods ra-
batter og markedsføringstilskud, Competition Council Meeting 30 March 2005, recital 70-
73, and Carlsbergs standardaftaler med horeca-sektoren, Competition Council Meeting 26 
October 2005, recital 167. In the later the contributions amplified other elements. 
35
 United cases C-40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114-73 - Suiker Unie, ECR 1975, p. 1663, re-
cital 513 where the discounts were awarded as price reductions. 
36
 See e.g. the Danish case Københavns Lufthavne A/S' terms of use for CPH GO, Competition 
Council Meeting 21 December 2011. 
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ea or to selected customers.37 Hence, the abusive elements of discounts appear to 
be the price reductions offered without countervailing advantages, for the pur-
pose of creating either a foreclosure (loyalty discounts), discrimination (discrim-
inatory discounts) or an artificial link between products or services (bundling 
discounts). However, following the EU case Intel38, a practical differentiation be-
tween a) quantum discounts, normally per see legal, b) loyalty discount, normal-
ly per see illegal and c) other forms of discounts subject to further investigation 
have been introduced. The full range of this is still subject to some unclearness 
but does indicate a need to evaluate loyalty discounts, including surrogates sepa-
rate. 
4. Loyalty discounts and surrogates 
Hoffmann La Roche, recital 89, established that discounts with the same effects 
as a formal exclusive agreements are to be treated accordantly, which in particu-
lar will be relevant if the discounts are conditional upon sourcing the entirety of 
the requirements from the dominant undertaking and hence loyalty inducing. 
From Intel39 it follows that exclusivity doesn’t have to be explicit. It’s sufficient 
that the customers are given the impression of an exclusivity obligation.40 C.f. 
Tomra41 it is  the sum of circumstances which decides if expressions and state-
ments of a decision to become or remain ”…preferred, main or primary suppli-
er…” have real and anti-competitive elements, and if the elements of a discount 
program support this. Likewise, it follows from e.g. Intel, that it is immaterial if 
the initiative for linking discount and loyalty comes from the customers.42 The 
dominant undertaking is subject to a special obligation to not impede competi-
tion. Finally, it follows from Hoffmann La Roche43 and Michelin I,44 that other 
forms of discounts are assed against: 
“…. all the circumstances, particularly the criteria and rules for the grant of 
the discount, and to investigate whether, in providing an advantage not based 
on any economic service justifying it, the discount tends to remove or restrict 
the buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar competitors from 
access to the market…” 
 
37
 C.f. case T-228/97 - Irish Sugar, ECR 1999, p. II-2969, recital 221. 
38
 Case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 75-78. 
39
 COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel and case T-286/09 - Intel. 
40
 See e.g. COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel recital 217-218, 235-237, 268, 306, 348-349, 360, 627-658 
& 689 for references to the subjective impression of the customers. 
41
 Case COMP/E-1/38.113 - Prokent/Tomra, recital 114-118. Confirmed with T-155/06 - Tom-
ra ECR 2010, II, p. 4361, recital 59. 
42
 C.f. COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel recital 920 & 964 with references to further practice. 
43
 See recital 90. 
44
 Case C-322/81 - Michelin I, ECR 1983, p. 3461, recital 73. 
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However, in practice, progressive retroactive discounts with steps, where the dis-
counts are calculated against the entire sale in the relevant period, and the bonus 
level increases with each step, have merited particular interest and intervention.45 
In the Danish case SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser,46 from 2007, any loyalty 
inducing effect was to be specifically assessed against the size of the discounts, 
the use of discount steps, retroactive  element and the reference period.47 The 
loyalty element induced by the use of progressive and retroactive discounts 
where further enhanced by the linking of two market segments, allowing pur-
chases within one to provide for a scale lift on the other48, and a general lack of 
transparency and clarity in the calculation of the discounts. 
In addition to exclusive discounts and surrogates, practice has dealt with target 
discounts with cumulative retroactive elements,49 conditioned upon meeting of 
predefined (individualized) targets e.g. a 10 % increase over last year’s purchases 
or acquisitions across different product categories. Such discounts have the effect 
of making it disproportionally expensive to source minor requirements from al-
ternative suppliers, foreclosing these, and have been reviewed and condemned in 
classic EU cases. In Hoffmann La Roche the discounts where offered as target 
discounts, estimated in advance and subject to an increase in accordance with the 
level of requirements sourced from the dominant undertaking. In Michelin I50 the 
discounts incorporated a variable yearly discount, calculated against a combina-
tion of last year’s procurements and the meeting of pre-fixed sales targets, also 
calculated against last year’s procurements. When appraising the later, the Court 
of Justice noted how discounts calculated against a long reference period could 
place the customers under considerable distress, especially at the end of a year, to 
meet the defined turnover targets, concluding that:  
“Such as situation is calculated to prevent dealers from being able to select 
freely at any time in the light of the market situation the most favourable of 
the offers made by the various competitors and to change supplier without 
suffering any appreciable economic disadvantage. It thus limits the dealers’ 
choice of supplier and makes access to the market more difficult for competi-
 
45
 See also ruling of the High Court of Eastern Denmark 22 June 2009, regarding TV 2 prices 
and conditions, e.g. pp. 124 & 125 noting how the involved company (TV 2) in practice 
had always secured a basis turnover, calling for the discount to be assed against its margin-
al effects and thus in practice being progressive and retroactive. 
46
 SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser, Competition Council Meeting 30 August 2007. Closed 
against commitment and therefore in principle undecided on whether there was abuse.  
47
 See recital 144 & 184 - 205. 
48
 See recital 14 & 213 - 215. 
49
 Meaning that the discount is calculated against the entire procurement, including past acqui-
sitions, providing for a negative marginal price for certain acquisitions. 
50
 Case C-322/81 - Michelin I, ECR 1983, p. 3461, recital 81-86. 
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tors. Neither the wish to sell more nor the wish to spread product more evenly 
can justify such a restriction of the customer’s freedom of choice and inde-
pendence. The position of dependence in which dealers find themselves and 
which is created by the discounts system in question, is not therefore based on 
any countervailing advantage which may be economically justified.”  
A loyalty discount identical to Michelin I was reviewed in the Danish case Opel 
Danmarks rabatsystem,51 where an annual bonus was conditioned upon meeting 
predefined turnover figures; not merely in general but within three different 
product categories and within each of the years quarters. In it’s appraisal the 
Danish Competition Council found that the bonus was designed for the purpose 
of inducing retailers to consolidate their procurements with the dominant under-
taking, thus preventing alternative suppliers’ access to the market. The foreclo-
sure effects were in particular caused by the use of52 a) last year’s procurements 
as a starting point for calculation of this year’s sales targets, b) a progressive 
scale and c) bonuses only being awarded subject to the meeting of all targets, in-
cluding targets specific to each category and quarter. Following a dialogue with 
the Danish Competition Council, the dominant undertaking accepted to adjust 
the awarding, allotting separate discounts in each product category and only for 
one quarter at a time. A largely identical discount, conditioned upon the expan-
sions of procurement, was appraised and condemned in Konkurrencebe-
grænsninger på markedet for ortopædiske sko53 and the EU case British Air-
ways.54 However, quarterly bonuses allotted in accordance with a sliding scale 
with limited progression has been accepted in Danish practice.55 
A variation on individualized target discounts, with the same effects and subject 
to the same level of condemnation, is a different form of top-slice discount. Un-
der such a system the discounts are allotted on extras exceeding the basis amount 
sourced from the dominant undertakings, and thus are potentially sourcable from 
a third party. Such a  system was appraised in the two EU cases Soda - Solvay56 
and Irish Sugar plc.57 However, top-slice discounts should only be considered 
 
51
 Opel Danmarks rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 28 November 2001. 
52
 Recital 29-34. See also the Danish case Skandinavisk Motor Co A/S - ekstrarabatsystem, 
Competition Council Meeting 19. June 2002. 
53
 Konkurrencebegrænsninger på markedet for ortopædiske sko, Competition Council Meeting 
23 February 2000. 
54
 Case C-95/04 - British Airways. 
55
 See e.g. the Danish case Skandinavisk Motor Co A/S - ekstrarabatsystem, Competition 
Council Meeting 19 June 2002, recital 95. 
56
 Case COMP/33.133 - C: Soda - Solvay, O.J. 2003L 10/10, recital 64 and 153-160. 
57
 Case T-228/97 - Irish Sugar plc, ECR 1999, p. II-2969. 
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abusive if incorporating cumulative elements, where previous procurements are 
also taken into consideration or within the context of predatory pricing.58 
A third variation on target discounts and their foreclosure effects was subject to 
appraisal in the Danish case LK A/S grossistaftaler.59 Here, the discounts came in 
the form of advance booking discounts with progressive elements. While the first 
was conditioned upon the placing of orders for the forthcoming year prior to 30 
of November, the later was allotted in a manner that was isolated from any cost 
reductions by the dominant undertaking. A third discount, which was considered 
to amplify the effects of the advance booking discounts rather than representing a 
separate infringement, was a discount offered on extras over the estimation. ’Ex-
tras over the estimation that were provided as part of the advance booking sys-
tem were, however, less advantageous and therefore encouraged the provision of 
a qualified estimation. The Danish Competition Appeals Board therefore labelled 
the discounts, especially the booking discount, as having a lock-in effect, specifi-
cally because the later couldn’t be adjusted and was estimated jointly with the 
dominant undertakings. Consequently, and in the absence of an economic justifi-
cation,60 the discount functioned as an exclusive agreement,61 and therefore mer-
ited condemnation as abusive.62 
A fourth variation on target discounts was reviewed in the Danish case Post 
Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem,63 involving a standardized discount system. 
However, following a closer review of the customers entry points, i.e. the sys-
tems’ effects in practice, a problematic sucking in effect was uncovered encour-
aging these to retain or expand their procurement. Consequently, while labelled 
as a standardized system, the applied system nevertheless displayed the charac-
teristics of the individualized target discounts. The Competition Appeals board, 
 
58
 Accepted by the Commission in DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Ar-
ticle 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuse, recital 168-169, but only partly reflected in 
Enforcement Paper. The consideration might be identifiable in recital 41, 2nd sentence de-
fining the effective price in conjunction with recital 43, finding it abusive to price below 
AAC. 
59
 LK A/S grossistaftaler, Competition Council Meeting den 20 December 2000. Largely con-
firmed by Danish Supreme Court ruling dated 7 January 2008.  
60
 See in contrast TV 2's priser og betingelser, Competition Council Meeting 21 December 
2005, recital 238 and Daniscos salg af industrisukker – rabatordninger og terminskon-
trakt, Competition Council Meeting 26 May 2004, both accepting different forms of cost 
reduction as defences for the advance booking.  
61
 See recital 109-125 and 113. 
62
 However, advanced booking discounts where accepted in Daniscos salg af industrisukker – 
rabatordninger og terminskontrakt, Competition Council Meeting den 26. May 2004. 
63
 Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 24 June 
2009, recital 521 – 529. 
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when reviewing the decision of the Danish Competition Council, could therefore 
conclude that these discounts mirrored the loyalty discounts because they were 
calculated based on the aggregated annual trade with a retroactive perspective.64 
Likewise, the Danish High Court notes that, when reviewing TV 2' priser og 
betingelser,65 regardless of their objective and standardized form, the applied 
discounts did in practice function in an individualized manner.  
In accordance with these principles, different forms of marketing contributions 
and payment were condemned in the EU case Intel66 and the Danish case Arla 
Foods rabatter og markedsføringstilskud,67 while selective price cuts and amal-
gamate discounts where condemned in the two Danish cases Post Danmark - 
adresseløse forsendelser68 and Scandlines rabatvilkår ved udstedelse af kombi-
nationsbilletter til lastbiler.69 In all of these cases, it was the foreclosure effects 
of the discounts that led to condemnation, regardless of their legal form and 
name. In Intel, some of the contributions had an indirect nature because they tar-
geted the retailers rather than the direct customer,70 but were nevertheless made 
subject to review after the principles laid down for other discounts. Further, con-
fusion and unpredictability has been contemplated as a separate form of abuse, 
but should instead be viewed as an amplifier71, as it puts the customers under 
 
64
 Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 10 May 2010 in Post Danmark v. Konkur-
rencerådet, p. 187. 
65
 High Court of Eastern Denmark 22 June 2009 in TV 2 priser og betingelser, e.g. p. 125. 
66
 See e.g. COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel, recital 615, 1641 & 1677 – 1681 for a detailing of the 
payment. Payment referred to as naked restrictions. 
67
 Arla Foods rabatter og markedsføringstilskud, Competition Council Meeting 30 March 
2005, recital 70-73, labeling marketing contributions as non-cost based discounts. See also 
the Danish case Carlsbergs standardaftaler med horeca-sektoren, Competition Council 
Meeting 26. October 2005, e.g. recital 167, where marketing contributions were held to 
amplify the effect of an exclusive agreement. 
68
 Post Danmark - adresseløse forsendelser, Competition Council Meeting 29 September 
2004, essentially overruled by Danish Supreme Court ruling 15. February 2013 following 
the EU Court of Justices ruling in C-209/10 - Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet. See also 
the EU case C-40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114-73 - Suiker Unie, ECR 1975, p. 1663, re-
cital 513.  
69
 Scandlines rabatvilkår ved udstedelse af kombinationsbilletter til lastbiler, Competition 
Council Meeting den 28 January 1998, where a discount was allotted to customers using 
Scanlines ferries when crossing two different straights. 
70
 See e.g. recital 179-181. Specifically it was noted how the marketing contribution was not 
linked to specific marketing activities and therefore appeared as loyalty inducing. See re-
cital 615. 
71
 C.f. case IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc, O.J. 1997 L 258 p. 1, recital 150. In the 
Danish case SuperGros' samhandelsbetingelser, Competition Council Meeting 30 August 
2007, recital 210, a non-transparent discount system is merely considered an amplifier ra-
ther than separate infringement. See also COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel, recital 945 
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pressure to respect the exclusivity.72 Finally, it should be noted, as detailed be-
low, that there is no requirement that an anti-competitive effect be caused by the 
loyalty discounts. In EU cases as British Airways,73 Michelin II,74 and Intel75, an 
abuse was identified regardless of indications of lack of effect in respect to in-
ducing loyalty and exclusivity. Loyalty discounts are condemned if capable of 
creating a foreclosure effect regardless of it’s name or form.76 The same ap-
proach was applied by the Competition Appeals Board, in the Danish case Post 
Danmark - magasinpost II,77 which noted that individualized target discounts 
and minimum conditions were reviewed against their ability to create an apprais-
able loyalty effect. Following the Court of Justices decision in Post Danmark I78 
from 2012, the exclusionary effect must, however, be real  or at least plausible. 
4.1 Pure loyalty discounts 
The fundamental criteria established in  Hoffmann La Roche and Michelin I have 
been retained and subsequently developed and indicate that there is a limited 
scope for offering discounts if these serve as surrogates for formal exclusivity 
agreements. That would in particular occur if the discounts are individualized 
and calculated against a longer reference period, typically more than 3 months,79 
or only allotted against defacto exclusivity, replacing a formal agreement.80 Of 
relevance would also be if the discount has a retroactive element which is calcu-
 
72
 C.f. case C-322/81 – Michelin I, ECR 1983, p. 3461, recital 83 and most likely Danish 
Competition Appeal Boards decision 10. May 2010 in Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, 
p. 187. 
73
 Case T-219/99 - British Airways, recital 293 and the Court of Justices ruling in case C-
95/04, recital 92-98.  
74
 Case T-203/01 - Michelin II, ECR 2003, p. II-4071, recital 239. 
75
  COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel, recital 268, 919 & 922. 
76
 C.f. fx case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 103. 
77
 Danish Competition Appeal Boards decision 8. December 2011 in Post Danmark v. Konkur-
rencerådet, p. 24. 
78
 Case C-209/10 - Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet.  
79
 C.f. the “1990 Coca Cola settlement” (see IP/90/7 – The Commission accepts a formal un-
dertakings from the coca-cola export corporation regarding its commercial activities in 
the community soft drinks market) 3 month reference period has been presumed accepta-
ble. Danish practice has partly picked up on this c.f. Opel Danmarks rabatsystem, Compe-
tition Council Meeting 28 November 2001. However, in Skandinavisk Motor Co A/S - 
ekstrarabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 19 June 2002, even quarter discounts 
where held abusive. The same follows from the EU case T-228/97 - Irish Sugar and the 
Danish case TV 2's priser og betingelser, Competition Council Meeting 21 December 
2005. In recital 143 of the latter it’s stated that the acceptable length of the reference period 
shall be calculated on a case - by - case basis followed by condemnation of a 12 month ref-
erence period. See also case T-203/01 - Michelin II, ECR 2003, p. II-4071, recital 85. 
80
 See e.g the Danish Competition Appeal Boards decision of 16 January 2001 in MD Foods 
Amba v. Konkurrencerådet, recital 5. 
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lated against earlier procurements or is limited to the current procurement. The 
later could hardly be loyalty-inducing but i.e. be appraised as predatory pricing if 
it fails to cover the direct incremental costs.81 After the outlined practice, in par-
ticular Michelin II, a discount would cover all forms of advantages or considera-
tions of an economic value offered by the dominant undertakings in exchange for 
loyalty. Furthermore, the effects could be amplified by special market conditions 
e.g. a large spread in market shares between the dominant undertaking and it’s 
competitor82 or special rights awarded by law.83 
The wideness of the discount concept can be illustrated by EU cases such as Van 
den Bergh Foods,84 Intel, and the Danish case Tele Danmark Mobils standard 
storkundekontrakt.85 In the first case it was considered abusive that the dominant 
undertaking had reserved the use of freezers, supplied free of charge for its own 
products,86 while the abuse in Intel involved cash donations to customers in ex-
change for stalling the marketing of computers utilizing processors produced by 
a named competitor.87 This named competitor was also victimized by (tradition-
al) discounts. In the latter case, Tele Danmark Mobils standard storkundekon-
trakt, it was held that a bonus convertible to extra acquisitions and allotted if cer-
tain targets were met, functioned as a loyalty discount, regardless of its form and 
name. The wide approach to loyalty-inducing discounts can also be illustrated by 
the Danish case EjendomsAvisens annonceaftaler,88 where it was the cumulative 
effects of a network of loyalty discounts that restricted competition. The case 
 
81
 C.f. case T-203/01 - Michelin II, ECR 2003, p. II-4071, recital 85. The Danish case TV 2's 
priser og betingelser, Competition Council Meeting 2. December 2005, recital 143 formu-
lates a presumption of progressive discounts as loyalty-inducing. However, this point was 
overturned administratively but ultimately upheld by Danish Supreme Court ruling 18 
March 2011. Following case C-209/10 - Post Danmark vs. Konkurrencerådet, the opinion 
looks problematic and it would most likely be more correct to disregard selective price cuts 
as loyalty- inducing unless below costs. 
82
 See e.g. Case C-322/81 - Michelin I, ECR 1983, p. 3461, recital 82. 
83
 See e.g. the Danish case Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition 
Council Meeting 24 June 2009, recital 579 - 590. 
84
 Case T-65/98 - Van den Bergh Foods.  
85
 Tele Danmark Mobils standard storkundekontrakt, Competition Council Meeting 16 June 
1999. The case relates to the Danish equivalent of Article 101 but could reasonably be 
translated to Article 102 in respect to the  example used. 
86
 The EU Commission considered it unlikely that more than one freezer would be squeezed 
into each retailers shop, thereby de-facto creating an exclusionary effect. See also the Dan-
ish case Carlsbergs standardaftaler med horeca-sektoren, Competition Council Meeting 
26 October 2005, recital 158 and COMP/39.116 - Coca Cola, for examples of these prin-
ciples applied to the supply of beers and soft drinks. 
87
 See recital 1641 - 1681. Despite supporting other forms of abusive discounts the cash contri-
bution was held as separate infringement. 
88
 EjendomsAvisens annonceaftaler, Competition Council Meeting 21 June 2000. 
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was appraised under the Danish equivalent to Article 101, and should conse-
quently be used with some caution. On the other hand, the case does illustrate 
how a parallel network of vertical agreements could limit competition jointly and 
merit intervention under Article 101. Transposed onto Article 102, it could create 
a situation where market conditions outside the control of the dominant under-
taking amplify the effect of the allotted discount, creating an anti-competitive ef-
fect. Finally, the latest EU cases Tomra89 from 2006 and Intel from 2009 offer 
notable considerations. In the first case, the Commission links the concepts of 
switching cost and foreclosure, identifying an abuse if discounts or other advanc-
es increase the cost of switching from the dominant supplier to another suppli-
er.
90
 In the latter case, the perception of the customers was taken into considera-
tion, making it sufficient that they had received the impression that it would have 
consequences to source requirements from a third party.91 
4.1.1 When to consider foreclosure plausible? 
Despite discounts being allotted against the entire procurement, i.e. incorporat-
ing a retroactive and cumulative effect, or in another way having a loyalty in-
ducing nature, a discount should not per se be considered able to create a fore-
closure and hence abusive. No foreclosure would be rendered from a (very) 
small discount which is unfit to induce loyalty,92 in particular if allotted on 
procurement that would have been sourced anyway from the dominant under-
taking, in accordance with a sliding scale subject to limited progression.93 On 
the other hand, high thresholds for the allotting of the discounts would involve 
the “free” part of the market, which is potentially sourceable from a third party, 
and hence be loyalty-inducing. When appraising the discounts, it would also be 
relevant to consider if these are awarded on the entire procurement, whilst only 
a limited part of the market, e.g. due to capacity constraints is contestable.94 In 
such a situation, even a small discount rate in % could have a strong suction 
effect on the contestable part of the market.  
In order to provide guidance, the EU Commission published its Enforcement 
Paper in 2009, suggesting the use of the effective price per unit and a competi-
 
89
 Case COMP/E-1/38.113 - Prokent/Tomra, recital 329.  
90
 See also case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 88, 143-150 and 201. 
91
 See i.a. recital 268, 306, 348-349, 627-658 and 689 for references to the subjective impres-
sions of the customers. 
92
 However, c.f. case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 116 no de minimus defence appears available un-
der Article 102, indicating how even very small discounts could be abusive. 
93
 C.f. e.g. Skandinavisk Motor Co A/S - ekstrarabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 19 
June 2002, recital 95. 
94
 C.f. case C-322/81 - Michelin I, recital 81-82; case T-203/01 - Michelin II, recital 87-91, and 
case T-219/99 - British Airways, recital 272-273. 
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tors ability to match this, as a proxy for a foreclosure risk and hence an 
abuse.95 When calculating this, distinctions are made between:96 
a) Incremental discounts, allotted only on procurements exceeding a defined 
level, and  
b) Retroactive discounts, also allotted against earlier procurements, requiring 
adjustments if part of the market is defacto locked to the dominant under-
taking and therefore uncontestable. 
While the effective prices in the first case are calculated only on the specific 
procurement, in the later they are calculated against the “free market”, other-
wise called the contestable share. Following these calculations, a presumption 
test was then formulated and presented in the Enforcement Paper. In this pre-
sumption test, an effective price covering the dominant undertaking’s Long 
Run Average Incremental Cost (LRAIC) is incapble of leading to a foreclo-
sure, while the reverse is presumed for prices below Average Avoidable Cost 
(AAC). For prices in between this spread, further analyses are stipulated.97 
Implicit in the presumption test lies the idea that only the foreclosure of an 
equally efficient competitor should be considered abusive.98 Furthermoew, the 
usage of the dominant undertaking’s own costs provides, at least in theory, for 
self-assessment prior to the launch of a new discount scheme.99   
The principles laid out by the Enforcement Paper represent a significant sim-
plification compared to the principles suggested in the prior Discussion Pa-
per,100 but are not supplemented by practical examples as the principles in the 
Discussion Paper were. Furthermore, the use of a somewhat loosely defined 
concept as a contestable share makes self-assessment in practice complex, if 
 
95
 See recital 36-45. In the previous DG Competition discussion paper on the application of 
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuse, recital 155-157 an number of additional ap-
proaches utilizing concepts such as Required Market Share (RQS) and Commercially Via-
ble Share (CVS) were used. It is unclear if these concepts represent a different approach. 
96
 Recital 36. 
97
 Recital 43. The test only establishes a presumption, allowing for intervention despite secur-
ing coverage for LRAIC.  
98
 In the Danish case Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council 
Meeting 24 June 2009, recital 502-507 it’s noted how the foreclosure of less efficient com-
petitors could be considered abusive.  
99
 In recital 24 the Commission reserves the right to use the competitors cost should it not be 
possible to calculate the dominant undertakings’. 
100
 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclu-
sionary abuse 
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not impossible.101 The Commission even reserves the right to intervene in un-
specified situations, despite leaving room from for an equally efficient compet-
itor.102 Finally, the competition authority is allowed a somewhat arbitrary as-
sessment when determining the contestable level of the market. In Intel,103 the 
EU Commssion e.g. limited itself by labeling Intel as an “unavoidable trading 
partner”, and therefore making the contestable market very limited. Conse-
quently, the testing was carried out against a very low market portion, leading 
to an equally low effective unit price. Some of the same elements can be iden-
tified in the Court of Justices approach to Tomra,104 which basically required 
the entire market to be open for competition.  
Regardless of it’s shortfalls, any attempt to provide an analytical framework 
for the assessment of discounts, and a move away from the per see condemna-
tion of retroactive discounts should be welcomed. Furthermore, the Enforce-
ment Paper actually summaries the most notable elements of the appraisal, e.g. 
the market position of the dominant undertaking vis a vis the competitors, the 
latter’s ability to counter the effect, substantial barriers and the scale of the 
abuse.105 It even signals a willingness to consider any efficiency arguments 
listed in defense of the discounts as a mitigating factor.106 However, in addition 
to some general prudence in respect to the many assessments provided for in 
the suggested analysis e.g. when calculating costs, market shares or a “contest-
able share”,107 it may be relevant to recall the Court of Justices ruling in British 
Airways108 from 2007. Not only were the market shares of the dominant under-
taking in decline here, indicating a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to foreclo-
sure the competitors,109 but the discount was also assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, emphasizing a) their ability to foreclose the market or lock-in the cus-
 
101
 More applicable principles have been suggested by Lars Kjølbye, Rebates under article 
82EC, Navigating uncertain waters, ECLR 2010, pp 66-80. 
102
 See recital 23. 
103
 COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel, recital 1010. An indirect analysis can be found in recital 1717 – 
1731. 
104
 Case C-549/10P - Tomra, recital 42. 
105
 See recital 20.  
106
 Se recital 21. 
107
 When producing multiple products, the fixed cost should in principle be allocated in ac-
cordance with some kind of cost - driver model. The same applies for high initial (start) up 
costs. Equally difficult for the dominant undertaking, could be to calculate the free market 
as it would require an understanding of the competitor’s production constraints. 
108
 Case C-95/04P - British Airways. See recital 68, 69 and 86. 
109
 See also COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel recital 267-268 for examples of customers switching 
without forfeiting the discounts, indicating that the loyalty requirement might be less set-
tled. 
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tomers, and b) any objective reasons for the system. Furthermore, in Tomra,110 
the Court of Justices disregarded the need to apply the principles outlined by 
the Enforcement Paper to cases predating its adoption. This principle was con-
firmed by Intel.111 
The principles from the Enforcement Paper were nevertheless put to use by the 
EU Commission in Tomra from 2006 and Intel from 2009, where dominant 
undertakings had, through i.e. retroactive discounts, foreclosed the market for 
vending machines and CPU units.112 Likewise, these principles were applied in 
the Danish cases Post Danmark – magasinpost I from 2007,113 as a supple-
ment, and Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem from 2009114 as an integrat-
ed part of the abuse analysis. In particular, Intel shows the challenges involved 
in the suggested framework, e.g. the scope of the free market for the purpose of 
calculating the contestable market share. Here the EU Commission ended up 
finding this somewhat limited.115 Furthermore, British Airways indicates, as al-
ready explained, that the need for an effect-based approach might be overem-
phasized.116 If a discount or discount scheme appears capable of creating a 
foreclosure, it will be considered abusive, regardless of its actual effect. The 
same would most likely be applicable to traditional target discounts, allotted 
against meeting specified sales targets. Principles put into effect in Tomra, 
where the Commission had built its case on a traditional form- based analysis, 
using the effect analysis from the later Enforcement Paper, to rebut lack of 
foreclosure ability. Neither the General Court nor the Court of Justice had any 
reservations against this and the later even noted in recital 72, that: 
”… Contrary to what is claimed by the appellants, the invoicing of ‘nega-
tive prices’, in other words prices below cost prices, to customers is not a 
 
110
 Case C-549/10P - Tomra, recital 81. See also recital 79 for further on the relevance of the 
principles outlined by the Enforcement Paper.  
111
 Case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 155-156. 
112
 See e.g. recital131 - 133 and the subsequent analysis in recital 134-270, in particular recital 
159-166; recital 180-187; 218-226; recital 234-240 and recital 264-270. See also the pro-
vided summary in recital 271-329, in particular recital 314-329. In addition to retroactive 
discounts, Tomra had also applied traditional exclusive agreements c.f. recital 114-130, 
supported by a discount program. 
113
 Forbruger-Kontakts klage over Post Danmarks priser og vilkår for magasinpost (Magasin-
post I), Competition Council Meeting 30 August 2007, recital 335-362. The offered con-
sideration on the marginal price can also be seen in Danish cases as Skandinavisk Motor 
Co A/S - ekstrarabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 19 June 2002, recital 76 and 
SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser, Competition Council Meeting 30 August 2007. 
114
 Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 24 June 
2009, recital 482 – 633. 
115
 COMP/C3/37.990 – Intel, recital 1012. 
116
 See recital 68-69 and recital 293 in the General Court’s ruling (T-219/99).  
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prerequisite of a finding that a retroactive rebates scheme operated by a 
dominant undertaking is abusive.” 
Followed by recital 79 detailing the offered considerations: 
”… the loyalty mechanism was inherent in the supplier’s ability to drive out 
its competitors by means of the suction to itself of the contestable part of 
demand. When such a trading instrument exists, it is therefore unnecessary 
to undertake an analyse of the actual effects of the rebates on competition 
given that, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 102 
TFEU, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct at issue is capable of 
having an effect on competition..” 
In accordance with these principles, the EU Commission opens Intel from 2009 
with a traditional analysis c.f. e.g. Hoffmann La Roche, followed by an effect 
analysis c.f. Enforcement Paper.117 The Commission does, however, explicitly 
maintain neither to be obligated by the later nor to consider it a part of the 
abuse standard.118 Furthermore, it is even ignored that part of the discounts 
might have been in vain, as some customers (unpunished) had shifted away 
from the dominant undertaking and the competitor thus gained market 
shares.119 The General Court confirmed this approach and the rendered argu-
ments stating that, in light of the discount’s nature, no effect analysis was re-
quired.120 It was sufficient that third parties’ market access had been disturbed, 
rebutting actual foreclosure or a negative margin as a requirement for an abuse. 
For other forms of discounts, which have a less obvious loyalty element, it 
might be more plausible that a defense capitalizing on lack of appraisable ef-
fect will be accepted.  
A prudent conclusion, joining the effect based approach tabled by the En-
forcement Paper with the rigid form based approach from e.g. British Airways, 
might be to consider the effect analysis as a defence, rather than part of the 
abuse standard. Alternatively, an analytical framework for verifying other 
analyses and presumptions could be employed, including taking into account 
that a discount system might be more troublesome than initially presumed. Un-
der the first doctrine, potentially abusive discounts could be legitimized by the 
same principles as other forms of objective justifications, while the latter could 
secure condemnation of standardised and innocent looking discount systems, if 
 
117
 See recital 920-1001. 
118
 COMP/C3/37.990 – Intel, recital 1002 og 1760. See also Enforcement Paper, recital 3 and 
the Danish case Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council 
Meeting 24. June 2009, recital 482, note 96. 
119
 See e.g. COMP/C3/37.990 - Intel, recital 267-268.  
120
 Case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 146-150. 
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these are loyalty inducing and hence anti-competitive.121 Furthermore, simple 
discount systems, void of top-slice & individualized elements or other ele-
ments of the loyalty discounts trades, might only be condemnable following an 
effect analysis c.f. Enforcement Paper. Support of this could in particular be 
found in the Court of Justice’s ruling in Post Danmark I,122 as detailed further 
below in section 5.4. However, Intel currently blocks this possibility by dis-
missing an effect analysis as a precondition for condemning loyalty dis-
counts.123 However, it would be recommendable for plaintiffs and defenders to 
structure their submissions before the Competition Authority in accordance 
with the listed effect analysis, including an explanation of how the discount af-
fects competition (negatively). 
Support for the suggested conclusion can be found in newer cases such as 
Tomra and Intel. In Tomra,124 the Court of Justice rebutted the need for eco-
nomic analysis when the discounts, incidentally, could foreclose competitors 
and it appears that the General Court came to the same conclusions in Intel125 
with it’s differentiation between a) quantum discounts b) loyalty discounts and 
c) other form of discounts. While the first was subject to a per see presumption 
of legality, the opposite was applicable to the second, rendering the third sub-
ject to further analysis, perhaps as tabled by the Enforcement Paper. However, 
no legal obligation to apply the Enforcement Paper could be identified. Conse-
quently, Intel provides for an alternative reading of the Enforcement Paper, 
where this is predominately of relevance outside traditional loyalty discounts, 
and subject to the per see prohibition, unless objectively justifiable. Under this 
reading the dominant undertaking must avoid all indications, direct or indirect, 
of a loyalty obligation attached to the discounts,126 but could, subject to this re-
quirement, use top-slide, discriminatory and lock-in discounts, even incorpo-
rating retroactive elements.127 The review of discounts would then follow a 
two-step analysis, where the first step involves identifying loyalty elements 
 
121
 See e.g. the Danish case confirmed by the ruling of High Court of Eastern Denmark 22 June 
2009 regarding TV 2 prices and conditions, pp. 124 og 125. 
122
 Case C-209/10 - Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet. 
123
 C.f. recital 144. 
124
 Case C-549/10P - Tomra, recital 79. 
125
 Case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 74-78 and 80-89. 
126
 C.f. case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 1334, the dominant undertaking can recommend its own 
product over the competitors in addition to discouraging sourcing from the later, provided 
its kept in general terms. Furthermore, it follows from recital 1547 that it is not considered 
evidence of a loyalty inducing purpose that certain words, associated with this, are actively 
avoided. However, an attempt to conceal this could be held as an indicium. 
127
 On the other hand, the Court of Justice did, in case C-95/04 - British Airways, recital 73, 
label retroactive discounts as particularly capable of creating loyalty, thus meriting some 
caution. 
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and void of such a second step appraising the foreclosure risk c.f. the Enforce-
ment Paper, including the creation of strategic access barriers. 
The matter of whether there is a legal obligation to undertake some kind of ef-
fect analysis is currently the subject of consideration before the Court of Jus-
tice, and tabled as a preliminary question.128 This question originated in the 
Danish Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem,129 from 2009. Here the Danish 
Competition Authority not only rebutted any obligation to apply the principles 
tabled by the Enforcement Paper, but also condemned a discount program 
which alleged to be standardized, but in reality tailored to have a loyalty- in-
ducing effect. The decision will most likely be available in 2015 or 2016. Fur-
thermore, an appeal has been logged in the Intel130 case before the Court of 
Justice, involving the legal standing of the Enforcement Paper and it’s princi-
ples. Until these decisions have been delivered it would be most correct to 
view the Enforcement Paper as a supplementary parallel to normal and restric-
tive practices and to avoid any reference to loyalty as a discount condition.  
4.1.2. When size matters – super dominance and quasi- monopolies 
The question of whether a super dominance theory involving a more rigid test 
could be formulated has been contemplated. The Court of Justice specifically 
rebutted this in TeliaSonera,131 from 2011, dismissing that different layers and 
degrees of dominance could be identified. However, it then subsequently rein-
troduced the concept by noting that the abusive behavior could not be reviewed 
in isolation from the degree of market power. There is therefore a double ele-
ment to TeliaSonera, whilst it at the same time rebuts the existance of a super 
dominance concept, but then subsequently embraces its core element, the dif-
ferentiated appraisal of potentially abusive behaviour, pending the market 
strength. The ambiguities where confirmed and developed further with the 
Court of Justices rulings in Tomra 132 and Post Danmark I,133 both from 2012. 
In the first it held that: 
”None the less, the degree of market strength is, as a general rule, significant 
in relation to the extent of the effects of the conduct of the undertaking con-
cerned rather than in relation to the question of whether the abuse as such ex-
ists.” 
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 Case C-23/14 - Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet. 
129
 Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 24 June 
2009, recital 521 – 529. 
130
 Case C-413/14P - Intel. 
131
 Case C-52/09 - Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, recital 78-81. 
132
 Case C-549/10P - Tomra, recital 39. 
133
 Case C-209/10 - Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, recital 23. 
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While it in the later is stated that: 
“When the existence of a dominant position has its origins in a former legal 
monopoly, that fact has to be taken into account.” 
In light of the problem of aligning the offered considerations with the rebutting 
of a super dominance theory, it would not be without merit to contemplate if 
companies in such a position are subject to further limitations in their commer-
cial terms. This appears to have been accepted in Danish practice. In Post Dan-
mark - Magasinpost II,134 the Competition Appeals board, reviewing the decision 
of the Danish Competition Council, refused to accept a meeting competition de-
fense in light of the very strong market position (more than 80%) enjoyed by the 
involved undertaking. This had been articulated more clearly in Post Danmarks 
direct mail-rabatsystem,135 involving the same company, where the Competition 
Appeals board explicitly used the term super dominance and applied it in the 
abuse analysis. 
While no super dominance theory can be formulated, it nevertheless appears that 
companies in such a situation might be appraised under a more rigorous abuse 
standard, limiting their ability to award discounts even further. This implies that 
companies in super dominant market positions, in particular if originating from a 
former legal monopoly, should be cautious in awarding discounts outside the 
narrow window of pure quantum discounts.  
4.2. Mixed bundling 
A variation of the loyalty discount is a different form of bundling discount, 
normally called mixed bundling, which is allotted subject to the sourcing of 
complimentary products or services. In Hoffmann La Roche, a special discount 
was only available if the entire assortment was acquired, and traditionally such 
discounts have been appraised as a variation of loyalty discount. In the Danish 
case DBC medier136 from 2005, a discount was reserved for customers sourc-
ing more than one product, thereby creating a link between those void of eco-
nomic justifications.137 From the later it would follow that mixed bundling 
could only be accepted if objectively justifiable. However, following the word-
ing utilized in Intel, it might be that mix bundling, short of being a traditional 
loyalty discount, would merit further considerations before being deemed abu-
 
134
 Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 8 December 2011 in Post Danmark v. 
Konkurrencerådet, p. 25 
135
 Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 10 May 2010 in Post Danmark v. Konkur-
rencerådet, p. 186. 
136
 DBC medier as, Competition Council Meeting 22 June 2005, recital 132-167. 
137
 See also the Danish case Rukos markedsadfærd, Competition Council Meeting 19 Decem-
ber 2001, recital 59-64. 
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sive. These considerations could include e.g. be the effective sale prices and 
the equally efficient competitor’s ability to meet these, as suggested in the En-
forcement Paper. 
4.3. Quantum discounts 
As stated by the General Court in Intel138, separate from loyalty discounts, a cat-
egory of quantum discounts can be identified, which is normally subject to a per 
see presumption of legality. Here, discounts are allotted on the basis of each pro-
curement, and in accordance with a standardized and proportional scale, repre-
senting a presumption of cost reductions for the dominant undertaking. These 
cost reductions can then be passed onto the customers in order to induce them to 
assist the process. The considerations can trace their lineage back to Hoffmann 
La Roche, recital 90, separating these from loyalty discounts “…quantity rebates 
exclusively linked with the volume of purchases from the producers…”. A con-
sideration expanded further with Michelin II, recital 58 finding how:  
“Quantity rebates are …. deemed to reflect gains in efficiency and economies 
of scale made by the undertaking in a dominant position.” 
Consequently, where an objective (economic) explanation can be provided in de-
fense of a discount, a much more lenient appraisal becomes available.139 The 
burden of proof falls with the dominant undertaking.140 Further, each step or el-
ement in the rendered discount system should be explainable.141 From the Danish 
Post Danmark - magasinpost II,142 it most likely follows that this doesn’t involve 
a cent- per- cent assessment requiring proof of every cent passed onto the cus-
tomers. In reviewing the case, the Competition Appeals Board accepted that cer-
tain savings were available to the customers, criticizing the Competition Authori-
 
138
 Case T-286/09 - Intel, recital 75-78. 
139
 Normally this would involve a cost reduction. However the Danish case TV 2's priser og 
betingelser, Competition Council Meeting den 21 December 2005, recital 163, provides 
for broader consideration - including efficiencies. See also the EU case C-163/99 - Portu-
gal v. Commission ECR p. 2613, recital 52, referring to added volume and economics of 
scale. In the Danish case Nissan Motor Danmark A/S indfører nye rabatbetingelser, Com-
petition Council Meeting 28 August 2002 it was accepted that converting to weekly orders 
would represent a cost reduction that could be passed onto the customers. 
140
 C.f. case T-228/97 - Irish Sugar, recital 188, case T-219/99 - British Airways, recital 281 
and case T-203/01 - Michelin II, recital 107. See also the Danish case Klage over Post 
Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 24 June 2009, recital 
469 with further reference. 
141
 C.f. case C-163/99 - Portugal v Commision ECR p. 2613, recital 56 and TV 2's priser og 
betingelser, Competition Council Meeting 21 December 2005, recital 140. 
142
 Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 8. December 2011 in Post Danmark v. Kon-
kurrencerådet, p. 26. 
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ty for failing to take these into consideration. On the other hand, Michelin II re-
cital 95 indicates how even quantity discounts could nevertheless have the 
“..characteristics of a loyalty-inducing discount system” if the following (three) 
elements are incorporated:    
 “…… there is a significant variation in the discount rates between the lower 
and higher steps, which has a reference period of one year and in which the 
discount is fixed on the basis of total turnover achieved during the reference 
period…..” 
In defense of the operated discounts, Michelin had i.a. referred to different form 
of economic of scales linked to an expansion of turnover, and therefore indirect 
cost reductions for the dominant undertaking. The General Court found these too 
general and unspecified,143 indicating that discounts claiming to be quantity re-
bates, should be allotted in accordance with a simple progressive scale and repre-
sent a cent- by- cent savings.144  
Under the same principles as Michelin II, a loyalty- inducing quantity discount 
was reviewed and condemned in the Danish cases Post Danmarks direct mail-
rabatsystem145 and TV 2 priser og vilkår.146 Despite being cloaked as a standard-
ized discount system, it was in both held that they could create a lock-in effect 
through the use of individualized target and retroactive elements calculated over 
annual reference periods. However, as indicated earlier, an alternative reading of 
Intel could lead to the interpretation that quantity discounts, regardless of any ar-
bitrary or dubious elements, are only condemned following an effect analysis c.f. 
the principles laid down by the Enforcement Paper. 
4.3.1. Quantum discounts, economics of scale and quasi- monopolies 
As already indicated, it follows from cases such as Michelin II, that the actual 
windows for utilizing discounts for the purpose of securing economies of scale 
through larger sales are somewhat limited. This is true even in sectors where a 
large portion of the cost base is fixed and the defense might hold some merits.147 
 
143
 See namely recital 108-109. 
144
 For further on Michelin II and the involved issues see e.g. Christian Roques, CFI Judge-
ment, Case T-203/01, Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v Commission, 
ECLR 2004, p. 688-693.  
145
 Klage over Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem, Competition Council Meeting 24 June 
2009, recital 521 - 529 and Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 10 May 2010 in 
Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, p. 187.  
146
 High Court of Eastern Denmark 22 June 2009 in TV 2 priser og betingelser, pp. 124-125. 
147
 For an undertaking with falling or low marginal costs and a large portion of fixed costs, it 
would often be beneficial to expand production for the purpose of securing economics of 
scale. This could involve discounts and in theory provide for a legitimate explanation. 
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The Enforcement Paper148 nevertheless makes an attempt to offer some guide-
lines by summarizing practices, as detailed above, followed by some principles 
offering guidance henceforth. This involves making a distinction between dis-
counts: 
a) which are granted for every purchase independent of the customers pur-
chasing behavior and hence unconditional, even if reserved for certain 
groups of customers, 
b) which are subject to the meeting of certain requirements and purchasing be-
haviors, and hence conditional, which in particular involves the “problemat-
ic” target and retroactive discounts. 
Provided the discount is neither selective nor discriminatory,149 and thereby loy-
alty- inducing, the Enforcement Paper signals a positive approach to discounts 
unless a foreclosure would be plausible. This situation is unlikely unless it in-
volves a significant portion of customers or customers of particular importance, 
and the discount represents a substantial reduction over list price.150 In assessing 
this, it would be required to take into consideration that:  
a) competitors normally would need to secure a minimum market share (min-
imum efficiency scale) in order to find it profitable to remain in the market 
and  
b) the price should not fall below the dominant undertakings LRAIC.151  
There is a link between the two considerations as LRAIC would ultimately be 
conditioned upon the size of the customer base required to support the costs, in-
dicating that the conditions are in reality formulated to secure an efficient com-
petitor market access, and prevent that the securing of economies of scale come 
at the price of a foreclosure.152 
 
148
 See recital 36-45. DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to exclusionary abuse, provided for much more detailed guidelines.  
149
 A selective discount, reserved for certain customers, would normally serve a strategic ob-
jective implying an anti-competitive purpose. However, following case C-209/10 - Post 
Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, it might be problematic to condemn these unless other el-
ements indicate an abuse. 
150
 See, in particular, the general principles outlined in recital 20 in conjunction with recital 36-
45, proving comments on the use of discounts. 
151
 See e.g. Enforcement Paper, recital 43-44. In DG Competition discussion paper on the ap-
plication of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuse, recital 154-157, where a higher 
standard was suggested by indicating a foreclosure risk if the price failed to cover Average 
Total Cost (ATC).   
152
 See also Enforcement Paper, recital 20, referring to different forms of economic of scale as 
qualifying elements.  
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Only a few elements can be extracted from practice in respect to economies of 
scale and discounts. In Intel, the Commission determined the competitors to be 
equally efficient, followed this by a evaluation of their ability to enter the market 
at a lower output,153 which later involved a proportionality test stipulating ”….. 
that the legitimate objective pursued by Intel should not be outweighed by the 
exclusionary effect.”154 Embedded in this appears to be a requirement that the 
securing of economies of scale shouldn’t lead to a foreclosure. The Danish case 
Post Danmarks direct mail-rabatsystem offers further confirmation of this by 
finding that even the less effective competitors should be secured market access, 
if it is plausible that it in the long run could be equally efficient.155 Furthermore, 
and much more explicit, it’s noted that the securing of economic of scale must 
not lead for foreclosure.156 This was full incorporated in the Danish case Post 
Danmark - magasinpost II,157 where the Competition Appeals Board, when re-
viewing the case, found that in light of the super dominant position (more than 
80 % market share), an efficiency defense could only be permissible to a very 
limited extend. 
In addition to the guidelines for exclusionary effects of quantity discounts, the 
Enforcement Paper offers considerations on the availability of an efficiency de-
fence. These considerations are both in general and in respect to the specific 
terms applicable for discounts,158 which include showing specifically how this 
would be secured through discounts or is linked to customer specific invest-
ments. Under the latter it would consequently be possible to use a discount, as a 
surrogate for a formal exclusive agreement, if required to make novel invest-
ments profitable or in response to market power downstream.159 
4.4. Selective price cuts and discounts 
Despite being subject to the same principles as other loyalty discounts, selective 
price cuts and discounts nevertheless merit separate comments. Factually, as they 
are not conditioned upon certain purchases, and legally, as it follows from 
AKZO160 and Post Danmark I,161 that pricing covering AVC/AIC are legal. Fur-
 
153
 See e.g. recital 1002. 
154
 See recital 1624 with reference to further cases and case T-340/03 - France Telecom, ECR 
2007, p. II-107, recital 217. While not dealing with discounts, the latter offers some con-
siderations as to what can be considered legitimate objectives.  
155
 See recital 502-507 referring to Enforcement Paper, recital 23. 
156
 See recital 621. 
157
 Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 8. december 2011, in Post Danmark v. 
Konkurrencerådet, p. 25. 
158
 See recital 45. 
159
 Downstream market power should not be confused with buying power.  
160
 Case C-62/86 - AKZO, ECR 1991, p. I-3359. 
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ther, Intel indicates the availability of a different and more lenient treatment of 
discounts not conditional upon loyalty. However, as outlined earlier, selective 
discounts share an overlap with predatory pricing and could, in principle, be 
viewed as either a variation on or a form of exclusionary discrimination when the 
discounts are reserved for selective customers. If viewed as the former, abuse 
would require pricing below AAC c.f. Enforcement Paper,162 while the princi-
ples for discrimination would govern the later. 
While not articulated explicitly in the Enforcement Paper, it appears to view se-
lective price cuts as a form of conditioned discounts subject only to condemna-
tion if, as detailed above section 4.1.1, prices fails to cover LRAIC, and perhaps 
AAC. The Court of Justices ruling in Post Danmark I163 from 2012, appears to 
confirm this. Firstly, by refusing to consider price discrimination as exclusionary 
per see, and secondly, by rebutting a foreclosure risk when the price, despite be-
ing below Average Total Cost, secured coverage of the Average Incremental 
Costs.164 While it might be too early to close the book on the matter, it appears 
that selective price cuts and discounts granted without any loyalty statements are 
only considered abusive if likely to lead to a foreclosure under the effect doctrine 
tabled by the Enforcement Paper.  
4.5. Defensive discounts 
It has been accepted that even the dominant undertaking should be allowed to 
defend its customer base against competitors preying on these, the socalled 
meeting the competition defense. In practice, the Commission appears some-
what reluctant to embracing the defence in respect to discounts. In Irish Sug-
ar,
165
 intervention was deemed merited against discounts favoring customers 
geographically located in specific yet marginal areas, most likely to switch to 
competitors should one of these chose to enter the Irish market. While no actu-
al competitors had been excluded, the pre-emptive foreclosure of the market 
was held to be abusive regardless of the defensive nature of the discounts. 
However, in BPB,166 it was accepted that price cuts had been concentrated to 
areas subject to a level of competition. When reviewing the case, the General 
Court found it relevant to note that it would not be permissible under this doc-
trine to entrench the dominant position, indicating a somewhat limited scope 
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 Case C-209/10 - Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet.  
162
 C.f. recital 43 and 64. 
163
 Case C-209/10 - Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, recital 30 and 37. 
164
 The Court might not agree on the utilized methods for calculating incremental costs c.f. re-
cital 32, 33 and 34 but nevertheless accept the involved principles. 
165
 Case T-228/97 - Irish Sugar plc, ECR 1999, p. II-2969. 
166
 BPB Industries, O.J. 1989L 10/50, recital 131-134. 
Where do we stand on discounts? - A Danish perspective  
 27
for its invocation.167 Furthermore, in the Danish case Post Danmark - ma-
gasinpost II,168 only a limited scope could be accepted for the super dominant 
undertakings. However, it was accepted in the Danish case C.K. Chokolades 
samhandelsbetingelser og bonusaftaler,169 on the grounds of buying power.170 
While the meeting competition defence is real, it’s actual scope is subject to 
lacunas and most likely limited to very specific situations,171 perhaps unavaila-
ble for undertakings with positions of quasi monopoly. 
4.6. Summing up on loyalty discounts and the way forward 
While the legal standing of the Enforcement Paper and its tabled approach to the 
review of discounts and foreclosure risk is subject to many lacunas, it has pro-
vided a better link between theory and practice. Normally, condemnation should 
be reserved for discounts capable of creating a foreclosure risk, and it falls upon 
either the competition authorities to prove this or the dominant undertaking to re-
fute it, depending on one’s understanding of subsequent case law. Further, com-
panies with super dominant market positions should be particularly careful be-
fore offering discounts outside the window linked to pure quantum discounts, 
normally considered legal per se.. Perhaps more notable is the distinction intro-
duced by EU cases such as Tomra and Intel, between discounts subject to a per 
see prohibition, and those meriting further considerations, as it mirrors the object 
versus effect analysis rendered available under Article 101. While it’s too early to 
speak conclusive on the matter, the later would perhaps represent the most im-
portant development in regards to single company conduct in recent years. 
5. Discrimination 
It follows from Article 102(c), and the Danish equivalent, paragraph 11 (3) no. 3, 
that it’s abusive to apply "… dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”, 
hence to discriminate. As discounts from a practical point almost always involve 
a discriminatory element, the provision is of paramount importance for the abil-
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 Case T-65/89 - BPB Industries, ECR 1993, p. II-389, recital 69. 
168
 Decision by the Competition Complaint Board 8 December 2011 in Post Danmark v. 
Konkurrencerådet, p. 25 
169
 C.K. Chokolades samhandelsbetingelser og bonusaftaler, Competition Council Meeting 28 
April 1999. The case is related to Article 101 and the Danish equivalent and should thus be 
used with some caution. 
170
 However, in the Danish case Konkurrencebegrænsninger på markedet for ortopædiske sko, 
Competition Council Meeting 23 February 2000, it was not taken into consideration that 
the buyer most likely held a dominant position on the procurement market. 
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ity to award them. Conceptual discrimination could be price or non-price based 
and involve either:172 
a) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, or  
b) applying equivalent conditions to dissimilar transactions.  
The decisive factor is the non-objective difference, placing the trading partners in 
a competitive disadvantage position. As a consequence of the effect- based ap-
proach contained in the the Enforcement Paper, not to mention the wording of 
the provisions, some kind of appreciable effects should, however, be required for 
an infringement to emerge.173 
5.1. Discrimination and other forms of abuse 
Despite being singled out by Article 102 and paragraph 11 as separate abuses, 
(price) discrimination often forms part of other infringements e.g. excessive or 
predatory pricing,174 often targeting a limited number of companies. The price 
drops in classic EU predatory pricing cases as AKZO175 and Tetra Pak II,176 had 
e.g. been reserved for a limited number of customers, thereby defacto incorporat-
ing a discriminatory element. Conceptually, there is however, no direct link be-
tween price discrimination and predatory pricing save for the simple fact that 
pricing below cost might only be feasible if possibly limiting its scope to selected 
customers. Furthermore, as the purpose of a predatory strategy often would be 
discipline rather than actual exclusions, a broad application is rarely required. For 
publically owned companies, where profitability might be of less importance, a 
strategy of preferential treatment of national or local customers might also be 
implemented177 and even private undertakings might find it beneficial to imple-
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 See e.g. case COMP/A.36.568/D3 - Scanlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg, recital 
276, for a recent case reciting this. 
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 The Enforcement Paper offers no guidance on discrimination. However, as detailed below, 
discrimination often entails foreclosure, making the principles applicable. Further, it would 
create some confusion by tabling a request for more effect- based enforcement and then 
limiting it to exclusionary behaviour.  
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 Or even margin squeeze c.f. the EU case AT.39678/AT.39.731 - Deutsche Bahn I/II. 
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 Case C-62/85, AKZO, ECR 1991, p. I-3359. 
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 Case 333/94P – Tetra Pak International SA, ECR 1996, p. I-5951. 
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 See e.g. case C-18/93 - Corsica Ferries, ECR 1994, p. I-1783, recital 45, case 95/364/EC - 
Brussels National Airport, O.J. 1995L 216/8, and Case No IV/35.703 - Portuguese Air-
ports, O.J. 1999L 69/31. For Danish cases illustrating the same issues see e.g. Fore-
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ment geographical price discrimination.178 Consequently, there is an overlap be-
tween discrimination, other forms of abuse, and the Single Market provisions. 
Further, even the concept of discrimination contains an overlap, as explained by 
the Commission in BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG179 from 2004, when noting:  
”The wording [of Article 102] covers three types of discrimination, the first 
two of them exclusionary and the last one exploitative: (i) the customer of the 
dominant firm is placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the dominant 
firm itself; (ii) in relation to other customers of the dominant firm; or (iii) the 
customer suffers commercially in such a way that its ability to compete in 
whatever market is impaired. It is obvious that type (i) and (iii) do not require 
a competitive relationship between the two comparator groups.” 
When dealing with discrimination, it is therefore relevant to differentiate be-
tween: 
⇒ Exclusionary discrimination, sometimes referred to as primary-line-
discrimination, initiated for the purpose of foreclosing competitors by tar-
geting actual or potential customers with selective price reductions or dif-
ferent forms of single branding agreements. 
⇒ Exploitative discrimination, sometimes referred to as secondary-line-
discrimination, initiated for the purpose of twisting competition in another 
market e.g. for the benefit of a subsidiary.  
Despite the textual framing of Article 102 and paragraph 11, referring to 
“…trading parties [placed] …. at a competitive disadvantage”, the provisions 
are not limited to secondary-line-discrimination. Exclusionary discrimination, 
hence primary-line-discrimination, are included as established with epic EU cas-
es as Suiker Unie and Hoffmann-La Roche, from 1975 and 1979 respectfully, and 
maintained in newer cases as Michelin II from 2003 and the Danish case that 
ended up as Post Danmark I from 2013.180 Neither could the two forms of dis-
crimination be considered mutually exclusionary and would in practice often 
overlap. In the EU case BPB Industries Plc & British Gypsum Ltd181, a discount 
was retracted from customers also sourcing products from a new competitor but 
expanded to those remaining loyal. The General Court noted in recital 119 that:  
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 See e.g. cases as C-27/76 – United Brands Company, case 333/94P – Tetra Pak, case T-
228/97 – Irish Sugar plc, ECR 1999, p. II-2969 and case C-226/84 - British Leyland, ECR 
1986, p. 3263, for examples of geographical price discrimination held to be abusive.  
179
 C.f. e.g. COMP/38.745 - BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG, recital 93. 
180
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2004. 
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"Such a practice, by virtue of its discriminatory nature, was clearly intended 
to penalize those merchants who intended to import plasterboard and to dis-
suade them from doing so, thus further supporting BG's position in the plas-
terboard market." 
In reality, both primary-line c.f. supporting BG's position in the plasterboard 
market and second-line c.f. penalize those merchants who intended to import 
plasterboard discrimination can can be extrapolated by the offered rationale.182 
However, in theory, the focus of Article 102 (c) and paragraph 11 (3) no 3 
should be second-line discrimination, as primary-line-discrimination would be 
covered by Article 102 subparagraph b and paragraph 11 (3) no 3. Furthermore, 
it is possible to deduce a third form of discrimination involving national based 
discrimination from EU practice that might be misplaced under Article 102, as 
detailed later.  
5.2. Unclear framework for the analysis 
Despite falling within what should be the core of Article 102 and the Danish 
equivalence paragraph 11, there are many ambiguities in our understanding of 
the concept of abusive discriminations. E.g. is it accepted (in economic theory) 
that the ability to price differentiate across markets and customer groups could be 
welfare enhancing,183 or an instrument for recouping large fixed costs and there-
by, in the case of unusual cost structure, securing the servicing of low- income 
customers.184 In particular, undertakings subject to different forms of Universal 
Services Obligations might find it beneficial to contemplate price discrimination 
void of sector regulation and compensation models. Consequently, discrimina-
tion would often be a perfectly rational decision, objectively justifiable on busi-
ness grounds rather than unreasonable and anti-competitive as the concept might 
initially indicate. Furthermore, historically, the prohibition embedded in Article 
102(c) and the Danish equivalent, paragraph 11 (3) no. 3, might have been to 
protect small and medium sized undertakings from getting less favourable terms 
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 See also case T-219/99- British Airways plc, ECR 2003, p. II-5917 and Post Danmark - 
adresseløse forsendelser Competition Council Meeting 29 September 2004 recital 128-
185. The later outlines the two concepts and application. 
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 C.f. Robert S. Pindyck og Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, fifth edition, Prentice Hall 
2001, p. 371-381, Simon Bishop & Mike Walker The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concept, Application and Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, p. 194-205 and Massi-
mo Motta, Competition Policy, Theory and Practice, Cambridge, 2004, p. 491-511. 
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 See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy, Theory and Practice, Cambridge, 2004, p. 495-
497 and Derek Ridyard, Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Ar-
ticle 82 – An Economic Analysis, ECLR 2002, p. 286-303 for further. 
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than larger competitors. This is an ambition that might be misplaced under com-
petition law as no consumer harm would be caused by this.185 
In light of the ambiguities, it should come as no surprise that the treatment of 
abusive discrimination, including discounts, is at best blurred. Furthermore, in 
concentrated markets, prohibiting price differentiation could promote collu-
sion186 and thereby be anti-competitive. Following the Court of Justice’s ruling 
in Post Danmark I,187 it might also be that primary-line discrimination isn’t a 
separate infringement but merely exclusionary conduct subject to the principles 
outlined above in section 4.188 A presumption particularly strong as the case orig-
inated in the Danish case Post Danmark – adresseløse forsendelser, identifying 
both primary- and second-line discrimination as abusive and separate infringe-
ments. 
5.2.1 The principles can be extracted from the wording 
A number of requirements of a legal nature can be extracted directly from the 
words utilized in Article 102(c) and the Danish equivalent, paragraph 11 (3) no. 
3, listing four qualifications before labelling discrimination abusive: 
a) Applying dissimilar conditions: The nature of the non-objective differentiat-
ed treatment is irrelevant, price or non-price based. Void of an objective ex-
planation, abusive could come in the form of selective discounts,189 ty-
ing,190 increased or uniformed prices191 or any other advantages with a 
monetary value. I practice, however, non-cost based discounts with loyalty 
inducing elements have attracted particular attentions and intervention. 
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 C.f. Robert O´Domoghue & Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 
2nd Edition Hart 2013, p. 249. 
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b) Equivalent transactions: The concept of discrimination requires the involved 
undertakings and transactions to be comparable. In United Brand192 and Tet-
ra Pak II193, geographical price differences were held as abusive through the 
applying of different conditions to comparable customers.194 The same con-
clusion was reached in the Danish case Afhentning af økologisk mælk på 
Samsø,195 where only organic milk producers were levied a surcharge due to 
their location in a peripheral area. In contrast, it was accepted in the Danish 
case Klage over prisdiskriminering,196 that two customers couldn’t be com-
pared due to differences in the size of orders and hence the associated costs 
for serving them. However, embedded in Afhentning af økologisk mælk på 
Samsø, might be that all milk producers (organic or non-organic) could be 
levied the same surcharge regardless of their geographical location and 
hence that it would elude condemnation (under Danish practice) to distribute 
extra cost endured by different universal service obligations; Even if this en-
tails that some undertakings will have to endure higher prices. In addition to 
prices, preferential treatment e.g. extended credit time, early or preferential 
delivery in case of deficiency,197 could be abusive as these have a monetary 
value. However, discrimination is not merely a question of identical treat-
ment but could also require dissimilar conditions. In the EU case British 
Sugar/Napir Brown198, the applied conditions didn’t allow for that custom-
ers could collect directly at the factory, compelling a downstream competitor 
to pay extra for services he didn’t require, eventually putting him in a disfa-
vorable position. It therefore becomes imperative what can be considered 
similar and comparable and if any differences are accepted. The later holds 
some significance, as pricing against willingness to pay and price sensitive-
ness could be welfare enhancing. While geographical price differences were 
in general held to be abusive in United Brand,199 it was nevertheless accept-
ed by the Court of Justice that “…differences in transport costs, taxation, 
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customs duties, the wages of the labor force, the condition of marketing, the 
differences in the parity of currencies, the density of competition may even-
tually culminate in different retail selling prices according to the member 
states.” Embedded in this is not only that prices may vary from market to 
market for cost reasons, but of much more pivotal consequence, also due to 
differences in “the density of competition” ,and that it thereby might not be 
abusive to capitalize on (some) customers’ ability to pay a premium. This 
was more clearly embraced by the General Court in Deutsche Bahn,200 con-
sidering but ultimately rebutting, that the differences in terms and prices 
could be attributed to the density of competition downstream.201 The same 
conclusion would appear to stem from the EU case Scanlines Sverige AB v 
Port of Helsingborg202, accepting that demand related conditions could ex-
plain (and justify) price differences. This might open more broadly for dif-
ferences between customers acquired under a tender process and those not, 
and prices targeted to a consumer’s willingness to pay.  
c) Trading parties: Abusive discriminations cover preferential treatment of 
own interests on a secondary market, as well as those of selected trading 
partners and have even been expanded to foreclosure of the primary market 
as initially detailed. However, no abuse could emerge void of at least a po-
tential competition situation between the companies offered different 
terms.203 It must therefore be established that the party that benefits from a 
discount scheme is competing with those placed at a competitive disad-
vantage position. In Tiercë Ladbroke204, no discrimination was identified 
e.g. as Belgian undertakings, denied a license, was not competing with the 
Germans who were granted a license, making it imperative to define the 
market correctly and very clearly.205 The same conclusion was drawn in the 
Danish case Klage over taksterne ved lastning af olie ved Fredericia 
Havn,206 absent competition between the different ships subject to the dis-
criminatory terms. Concluding that abusive discrimination requires the un-
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dertakings to be active in the same market, an open question emerges when 
markets convert e.g. for technical reasons.207  
d) Placing them at a competitive disadvantage: It follows directly from the 
wording of the provisions that an appreciable negative effect on competi-
tion is required.208 However, implementing this in practice has been com-
plex and does not appear to have attracted much interest of enforcers.209 
Significantly, more interest has been shown regarding objective justifica-
tion,210 most significantly in respect to cost reductions.211 While this might 
create the same result, there is a significant difference between thwarting 
competition and objective justification. However, recent Danish practice 
might, as detailed below, have corrected this. 
Further requirements can be extracted from the general principle of an apprecia-
ble effect on competition, e.g. that a products or service essential for access to 
the downstream market212, representing a substantial part of the value of the fi-
nal products must be involved.213 A recent example of the later can be seen in the 
Danish case CPH GO214 from 2011, where a discount reserved for certain opera-
tors in Copenhagen Airport amounted to between 34 % and 43 % of the profit 
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margin and was therefore distorting. Furthermore, as part of the essentiality dis-
cussion, the presence or absence of barriers to the primary market should be con-
templated for the purpose of considering the ability to counter any abuse.215 No-
table would also be the use of progressive steps beyond the insignificant. The 
Danish case SuperGros’ samhandelsbetingelser,216 was e.g. closed with a com-
mitment agreement providing for some steps indicating that mathematic equality 
is not required. 
A somewhat cryptic phrase was offered in the Danish case Klage over prisdis-
kriminering217 by labeling it abusive that a discount system had been designed 
with the effect that only large purchaser could benefit from it. Only a short press 
release is available on the case, limiting the conclusions to be extracted. A possi-
ble reading is, however, that the Danish enforcer finds that all undertakings 
should be secured access to a discount system. On the other hand was it accepted 
in the Danish case Prisdiskrimination på Århus Sporvejes abonnementskort,218 
that discounted transportation tickets could be reserved for local residents. In 
support of this conclusion, it was stated that geographical discrimination created 
neither a loss of welfare or twist of competition. Embedded in this might be that 
only discrimination targeting undertakings are abusive, while discrimination of 
consumers normally would elude condemnation. A somewhat different approach 
was demonstrated by the Commission in PO/World Cup 1998219 where discrimi-
nation of consumers was singled out as a particular heinous form of abuse. Some 
remarks on this issue will be offered later.  
5.3. Primary-line-discrimination - foreclosure of the primary market  
The dominant undertakings’ ability to target customers with attractive (and selec-
tive) offers for the purpose of retaining or gaining their loyalty, hence primary-
line-discrimination, falls within the core of abusive discrimination. Furthermore, 
this also covers different forms of pre-emptive foreclosure, where no actual 
competitor has accessed the market, but this might be eminent as demonstrated 
by the EU case Irish Sugar.220 Here the discount had been reserved for customers 
in boarder areas and hence those most likely to switch to a non-domestic suppli-
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er, should this decide to enter the Irish market. In reality, a clear line can be 
traced from early practice as Suiker Unie and Hoffmann-La Roche to newer cases 
as Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports221 and Michelin II, in the condemna-
tion of non-cost based discounts under Article 102 (c). The anti-competitive ef-
fect of selective and discriminatory discounts with a loyalty - inducing elements 
were identified already with Hoffmann-La Roche, making the Court of Justice 
align loyalty discounts with a formal exclusive agreement, as detailed above sec-
tion 4. Utilizing the same principles, discounts conditioned upon meeting prede-
fined turnover figures (target discounts) were held as discriminatory, and hence 
abusive, in Michelin I. Abusive discrimination was also identified in Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transports from 2000,222 where selective price cuts fell short of 
the concept of predatory pricing, but nevertheless had targeted a named competi-
tor, and therefore merited condemnation in the opinion of the Commission. In 
contrast to the Commission, neither the General Court nor the Court of Justice 
referred to Article 102 (c) and it remains unknown if this was done intentional-
ly.223 
The framework for analyzing discriminatory discounts was established by the 
Court of Justice in Michelin I, recital 73, noticing that the appraisal should:  
"….consider all the circumstances, particularly the criteria and rules for the 
grant of the discount, and to investigate whether, in providing an advantage 
not based on any economic service justifying it, the discount tends to remove 
or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar compet-
itors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transaction with other trading parties or to strengthen the dominant position 
by distorting competition”  
Additional to the foreclosure risk, the absence of cost based justification appears 
to have motivated the critique of the offered discounts. However, following Post 
Danmark I224 from 2012, this might have been mitigated. Here, the Court of Jus-
tice refuses to label primary-line-discrimination as exclusionary and pricing be-
low Average Total Cost as abusive per see, solely based upon the discriminatory 
element. Void of other loyalty - inducing elements, Post Danmark I might have 
reserved condemnation of selective price cuts to prices failing to cover Average 
Avoidable Cost and embedded in this that primary-line discrimination is not a 
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separate abuse. A position accepted in Danish practice with Forbruger-Kontakts 
klage over Post Danmarks priser og vilkår for magasinpost 225 from 2007, not-
ing how primary-line discrimination was a form of exclusion not involving a 
separate abuse. 
5.3.1 A narrow window if foreclosure is plausible 
Recent practice has followed the path laid down with Michelin I requiring a cost 
explanation for discounts. In Michelin II from 2003, the use of discounts to in-
centivize retailers to invest in the presentation of products and services was held 
to be abusive discrimination infringing Article 102 (c)226, void of an objective 
justification. In Wanadoo227 from 2003, a defense involving economic of scale 
and scope was rebutted against allegations of predatory pricing. While not in-
volving discrimination, the case indicates that production optimizations argu-
ments are only permissible if involving clearly identifiable cost reductions. The 
restrictive approach has been confirmed by British Airways228 from 2007, where 
the Court of Justice refused the relevance of declining market shares falling from 
46 % to 40 % and thereby potentially a limited effect. However, Michelin II 
might have been over interpreted if presumed to preclude all non-cost based dis-
counts. Despite criteria which appear objective and transparent, the General 
Court nevertheless noted the actual awarding of discounts as discretionary and 
able to create a pressure on the retailers to meet predefined sales targets which 
might have tainted the outcome. In recital 140 the Court notes that: 
"The granting of a discount by an undertaking in a dominant position to a 
dealer must be based on an objective economic justification (Irish Sugar v 
Commission, cited at paragraph 54 above, paragraph 218). It cannot depend 
on a subjective assessment by the undertaking in a dominant position of the 
extent to which the dealer has met his commitments and is thus entitled to a 
discount. As the Commission points out in the contested decision (recital 
251), such an assessment of the extent to which the dealer has met his com-
mitments enables the undertaking in a dominant position to put strong pres-
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sure on the dealer ... and allow[s] it, if necessary, to use the arrangement in a 
discriminatory manner.” 
This is followed by recital 244, concluding how the applied discounts defacto 
had created a loyalty effect and artificial entry barriers for competitors and recital 
108-109 rebutting general references to economic of scale and cost reductions. 
Rather than concluding that only cost reductions are admissible in defense of 
discriminatory abuse allegations, it would be more plausible to read the ruling as 
requiring more firm evidence in support of such claims. The same conclusion 
would most likely stem from Wanadoo, where the Commission had used the op-
portunity to not only rebut the presented arguments of economic of scale and 
scope, but also to point out that other, less anti-competitive instruments had been 
available had the interest been genuine.229 It sounds plausible to presume that the 
outcome of the cases was influenced by these considerations. 
Cases such as Michelin II, Wanadoo and British Airways have indicated a very 
narrow window for discounts and selective discounts not directly linked to quan-
tum, reflecting a cent - by - cent cost reduction if discriminatory.230 However, 
accepting that primary-line-discrimination is another word for foreclosure, the 
principles developed earlier should be applied, reserving condemnation to dis-
criminatory discounts able to foreclosure an equally efficient competitor. In par-
ticular, Post Danmark I231 from 2012 is supportive of this by refusing to label 
primary-line-discrimination as exclusionary merely on the grounds of pricing be-
low Average Total Cost. A standardized discount system void of arbitrary and 
subjective award criteria, as in Michelin II, might be permissible unless the effec-
tive price falls below AAC regardless of any discriminatory elements.232   
5.3.2 Sectors with unusual cost structures 
As detailed earlier, it might be welfare - enhancing to allow undertakings with a 
large portion of fixed costs to implement different forms of price discrimination 
for the purpose of creating an incentive, also to service low income groups.233 
Regardless of the embedded discrimination of those compelled to pay a higher 
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price, no consumer welfare losses are created by this per see. Consequently, even 
undertakings void of competitors might have an objective reason for price dis-
crimination e.g. in the form of selective discounts that should not be ignored. 
However, no cases have so far emerged involving this “defense”.  
5.4 Second-line-discrimination 
Second-line-discrimination covers, as explained by the Commission in 
BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG, two form of anti-competitive behavior: 
a) Discrimination of downstream trading parties, which, in the absence of a 
better word, could perhaps be labeled as ”real discrimination” or “exploitive 
discrimination”. 
b) Discrimination in favor of vertically - integrated or group - affiliated down-
stream interests, which essentially is a foreclosure.  
While in principle second-line discrimination covers both forms of behavior, it 
would make some sense to reserve the concept to the first, as the second should 
follow the principles laid out for foreclosure and primary-line-discrimination. 
Furthermore, void of elements thwarting the Single Market, e.g. nationality 
based discrimination, second-line-discrimination might not be considered abu-
sive by the Commission unless it takes the form of exploitation.234 In contrast, a 
number of cases have been decided in Danish practice on the matter, which often 
condemn any dissimilarities in the offered terms and conditions. Therefore, from 
a practical perspective, different forms of second-line-discrimination could be 
held abusive regardless of the unclear theoretical framework for accepting this. 
5.4.1 Discrimination of downstream trading parties 
Discrimination in favor of vertically integrated downstream interests has, from a 
practical perspective, attracted special interest under Article 102 and the Danish 
equivalent, paragraph 11. In the EU case Portugal v. Commission235, it was held 
to be abusive under Article 102 (c) when a linear and quantum discount had 
defacto benefitted national air operators. This was not because some got better 
terms than others, as this is inherent in quantum discounts, but was due to high 
thresholds that could only be met by a few particularly large partners and the ab-
sence of linear progression in the increase of the quantity discounts. Of interest is  
also British Airways, where only travel agencies that had increased sales and met 
defined sales targets were allotted special discounts. In defense of this it was ar-
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gued, with no success, that travel agencies meeting defined sales targets had a 
higher value for the dominant undertaking and should not be compared with 
those failing to do this.236 An interesting consideration was rendered in the EU-
case PO/World Cup 1998237 labeling (national) discrimination of consumers as a 
particularly aggressive form of discrimination under Article 102 not subject to a 
requirement of effect on the structure of competition. These principles have been 
applied in Danish cases. In Song Networks238 from 2004, the use of progressive 
increases was held to be abusive for its ability to discriminate between large and 
small customers and impose a competitively disadvantageous position on the lat-
er in the form of higher costs. Without challenging the conclusion, the offered 
rationale might have missed a central element of Portugal v. Commission, re-
serving condemnation for discounts with a selective element, making it insuffi-
cient that some get better terms. Consequently, the translation into Danish prac-
tice has been somewhat troublesome. 
5.4.1.1 The requirements follow the general conditions 
Preferential treatments of customers are abusive subject to the general criteria 
listed above in section pkt. 5.2.1, requiring that a product or service be essential 
for market access downstream, representing a substantial part of the value of the 
final product and void of objective justifications. A number of Danish cases can 
further illustrate this.239 In Klage over Post Danmarks prisforhøjelse på distrik-
tsbladsomdelingen240, differences in the underlying costs for servicing rural areas 
v. cities could explain the offered differences in terms and prices while no such 
explanation was found in CPH GO.241 Further, in Klage over taksterne ved last-
ning af olie ved Fredericia Havn,242 no discrimination was identified void of 
competition between the different ships subject to the “discriminatory” treat-
ments. In Klage over prisdiskriminering,243 it was held to be abusive when a dis-
counts system (intentionally) was limited to larger customers precluding minors. 
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Only a short press release is available, but the case does indicate that under Dan-
ish practice, all must be secured access to a discount system. More explicit are 
Song Networks244 from 2004, condemning discounts favouring large customers, 
while this also appears to emerge from Knud Wexøe A/S' vilkår for levering af 
kabelkanaler.245 In this case,  a somewhat selective policy for granting of a 
wholesale discount was determined to be discriminatory. No formal discussion 
was rendered following an adjustment of the discount policy, also allowing mi-
nor wholesalers access to the discount program. In Tele Danmark Mobils stand-
ard storkundekontrakt246, an ober dictum is offered, indicating that it could be 
abusive to apply a discount system with high turnover figures. This consideration 
was followed through in LK A/S grossistaftaler,247 where an advanced ordering 
discount was held to be discriminatory as it could lead to different prices for 
comparable customers and orders.248 
The cited Danish cases indicate that the Danish enforcer precives that all cus-
tomers, void of an objective justification, must be offered equal access to a dis-
count system.249 In particular would it be abusive if, c.f. Song Networks large 
customers are offered better terms than small customers. If this perception is 
solely based on the ambition of protecting small and medium sized undertakings, 
lacking the bargaining power of larger competitors, it might be misplaced in 
competition law.250 However, practice is not consistent. In Klage over ændrede 
forhandler vilkår for Nilfisk støvsugere,251 it was held to be acceptable that a dis-
count was conditioned upon the meeting of minimum turnover figures. More im-
portantly is that the rendered conclusions not are comparable with the principles 
derived from the EU case Portugal v. Commission, reserving condemnation to 
discounts with a selective element, making it insufficient that some gets better 
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terms. KMD’ prisdifferientering overfor kommunal kunder252 from 2013, might 
have corrected this by refuting that it is per see discriminatory that larger cus-
tomers get better terms than small and medium sized customers. Furthermore, 
improvements have been made through CPH GO253 from 2011, where the Dan-
ish Competition Council determined it to be discriminatory that a discount ac-
counting for between 34 % to 43 % of the (profit) margin had been reserved for 
selected customers. This is a most important rationale, as it makes it clear that 
only discrimination which is able to twist competition downstream should be 
condemned as abusive. However, accepting this, the cited Danish cases predating 
KMD’ prisdifferientering overfor kommunal kunder and CPH GO might no 
longer be valid. 
5.4.2. Preferential treatment of own interest 
In contrast to the uncertainty clouding the non-integrated undertakings interest in 
discriminating between customers, a level of consensus has emerged on the need 
to prevent favorable treatment of own affiliated undertakings.254 In particular, the 
implementation of a vertical integration should not be accepted as a loophole al-
lowing circumvention of the discrimination prohibition.255 However, the basic 
requirement detailed above must still be met, requiring a product or service es-
sential for downstream access and representing a (large) portion of the final 
products value. Furthermore, as detailed earlier, incentive and ability are not the 
same and the vertically integrated undertaking might not always find it interest-
ing to discriminate.  
In practice, different forms of discrimination in favour of affiliated undertakings 
have been condemned in EU cases such as Deutsche Bahn256 from 1997 and 
Clearstream257 from 2004. While neither of these relate to discounts, they never-
theless show how Article 102 (c) can be used against price policies which favour 
group - affiliated undertakings. The Danish case Song Networks258 from 2004, 
 
252
 KMD’ prisdifferientering overfor kommunal kunder, informal statement 3 April 2013. 
253
 Københavns Lufthavne A/S' terms of use for CPH GO, Competition Council Meeting 21 
December 2011, recital 485. 
254
 C.f. EU cases as 33.941 - HOV SVZ/MCN, O.J. 1994L 104/34, recital 245–247 and case C-
260/89 - Elliniki Radiophonia, ECR 1991, p. I-2925, recital 36-38. 
255
 See e.g. John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply 
Competitors, and Access to Essential Facilities, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1994, p. 
280 and Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimination under EC Competition 
Law: The need for a case-by-case Approach, GCLC Working Paper 07/05, p. 33. The lat-
ter suggest the use of Article 102 (b) as an alternative. 
256
 Case T-229/94 - Deutsche Bahn AG, ECR 1997, p. II-1689. 
257
 Case COMP/38.096 - PO/Clearstream (Clearing and settlement). 
258
 Song Networks’ klager vedr. Erhvervstelemarkederne, Competition Council Meeting 28 
April 2004, recital 221.  
Where do we stand on discounts? - A Danish perspective  
 43
involved discounts favoring larger customers, of which the largest “accidently” 
happened to be a vertically integrated subsidiary. 
5.5. National based discrimination 
As noted earlier, a practice has emerged in EU cases condemning national 
based discrimination, including different forms of discounts reserved for na-
tional or local undertakings. This practice can be seen in cases such as Corsica 
Ferries,259 where the local association of harbor pilots had reserved the most 
favorable tariffs for ships under the Italian flag. This was held to be abusive 
and discriminatory by the Court of Justice. Other examples can be seen in EU 
cases such as Brussels National Airport260 and Portuguese Airports,261 where 
tariffs for the use of airports had been designed with the purpose of securing 
better terms for domestic operators. Essentially the same issue was involved in 
the two Danish cases forespørgsel om lovligheden af takstdifferentiering på 
færgepriser,262 and fastlæggelse af færgetakster263, where the offered tariffs for 
the use of ferries had favoured locals undertakings by awarding these a special 
discount. A case of reverse national discrimination can be seen in the Danish 
case Aalborg Portlands cementpriser264 Here it was held to be discriminatory 
when domestic customers were levied a higher price than non-domestic.  
A particularly aggressive form of discrimination in EU practice is discrimination 
of end users c.f. PO/World Cup 1998.265 Here, French football fans were secured 
preferential access to a number of tickets not accessible to non-domestic fans. 
The Commission found this policy so heinous that it was not required to identify 
an anticompetitive effect. This is interesting, as Danish practice has not em-
braced this. In Prisdiskrimination på Århus Sporvejes abonnementskort,266 it was 
accepted that discounted transportation tickets could be reserved for local resi-
dents, as it neither thwarted competition nor created a welfare loss. Under Danish 
practice, only discrimination by undertakings which are able to twist competition 
would be abusive, in contrast to EU practice. While national based discrimina-
tion and preferential treatment of local undertakings often would hamper the sin-
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gle market, and the single market project, placing these under Article 102 (c) 
might be less obvious.267 Consequently, Danish practice might be right when re-
serving condemnation to situations where there is a clear thwarting of competi-
tion. 
5.6. The somewhat unclear approach on discriminatory discounts 
Despite the outlined principles indicating how discrimination could be appraised 
and held abusive, there are still a number of troublesome uncertainties making it 
unclear how to view discriminatory discounts. 
a) Firstly, it is not evident that price discrimination in the form of selective 
discounts should be held abusive. For non-dominant undertakings it is wel-
fare maximizing to price differentiate between customers and markets, tar-
geting the individual customers’ willingness to pay. Case law opens a win-
dow for the dominant undertaking’s ability to pursue the same price strate-
gy,268 and economic theory takes a much more positive view on this. In par-
ticular, in sectors with large fixed costs and a need to recoup these, price 
discrimination could be an instrument for securing universal service in the 
absence of sector regulation and direct compensation models. Furthermore, 
in sectors prone to collusion and uniformed pricing, prohibiting price dif-
ferentiation and (secret) discounts could entrench this. Regrettably, it is dif-
ficult to draw a clear red line through case law, which unifies it with the 
economic theory supposedly governing competition law.  
b) Secondly, cases decided under Article 102 (c) and Danish Competition Act 
paragraph 11 (3) no. 3, have in contrast to other provisions not embraced a 
requirement of an anti-competitive effect. This is regardless of the utilized 
wording of the provision actually citing such a requirement. In particular 
(older) Danish practice disregards this, condemning discounts favouring 
larger customers almost per see, while on the other hand, EU practice 
shows little understanding for national based discrimination favouring do-
mestic customers. Both could therefore benefit from a re-thinking of prac-
tice requiring an anti-competitive effect. 
c) Thirdly, the concept of abusive discrimination has been developed beyond 
the wording of the provisions by also regulating exclusionary conduct and 
national based discrimination. Consequently, it is not only difficult to estab-
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lish a coherent practice, but other forms of abuse, failing to meet the de-
fined standards, might be pursued under Article 102 (c) and the Danish 
Competition Act paragraph 11 (3) no. 3. Predatory pricing, loyalty dis-
counts, margin squeeze and refusals to supply are not only abuses in their 
own right, but also sharing an overlap with (pure) discrimination, making it 
attractive to pursue them as such if failing to meet the defined standards. 
Case law demonstrates several examples of this as detailed above. 
e) Fourthly, the theoretical foundation for condemning discrimination is 
somewhat unclear. Moreover, there are even indications of a non-alignment 
between Danish and EU practice, and an EU approach void of a clear link 
to the economic theory supposedly governing competition law. Conse-
quently, it not only unclear what to condemn but also how to view discrim-
ination; Either as a non-objective differential treatment or a form of ex-
ploitive practice.  
In light of the many problems of establishing a clear coherent approach to dis-
crimination, it would be much appreciated if the Commission would table it’s 
guidance paper on discrimination as promised in 2005.269 Regrettably, there are 
no indications of any such interest.  
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